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PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS




The concept of prosecutorial vindictiveness as a due process claim is
relatively new.2 Traditionally, a prosecutor's actions or motives were rarely
questioned;3 his broad discretionary powers precluded such inquiry.4 Re-
cently, however, defense attorneys have used the prosecutorial vindictive-
ness theory to quash indictments that originated in a prosecutor's
displeasure with a defendant's assertion of his rights. Despite the growing
popularity of this trend, the United States Supreme Court has not applied
the vindictiveness theory in a pretrial setting.' The New Mexico Supreme
1. 96 N.M. 627, 633 P.2d 1225 (1981).
2. Note, Prosecutorial Vindictiveness: An Examination of Divergent Lower Court Stan-
dards and a Proposed Framework for Analysis, 34 VAND. L. REv. 431, 432 (1981). It
should be noted that the United States Supreme Court has never enunciated an
actual definition of vindictiveness. See Plea Bargaining: Limits on Prosecutorial Discre-
tion, 1979 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 27, 42.
3. See Van Alstyne, In Gideon'r Wake: Harsher Penalties and the Successful Criminal
Appellant, 74 YALE L.J. 606 (1965).
4. Missouri has consistently given great deference to the powers of prosecuting
attorneys. In State ex rel. Schultz v. Harper, 573 S.W.2d 427 (Mo. App., K.C.
1978), the court refused to require the prosecuting attorney to file certain affidavits,
stating that "the prosecutor-appellant was vested with the absolute discretion as to
whether or not he would file informations . . . subject only to his obligation to
investigate the facts and the law applicable and reach his own conclusion thereon."
Id. at 431. See generally Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Proseculorial Power, 94 HARV. L.
REv. 1521 (1981) (prosecutors have unjustifiably broad power which needs to be
restrained); Note, Prosecutorial Misconduct: The Limitations upon the Prosecutor's Role as
an Advocate, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1095 (1980) (conflict between role of prosecutor
as officer of the court and as advocate); Plea Bargaining: Limits on Prosecutorial Discre-
tion, supra note 2 (survey of prosecutor's role in criminal justice system). But see
Mellon, Jacoby & Brewer, The Prosecutor Constrained by his Environment. A New Look at
Discretiona.Justice in the United States, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 128 (1981)
(prosecutors unnecessarily restrained by environment, prosecutorial abuse rare); Sil-
bert, The Role of the Prosecutor in the Process of CriminalJustice, 63 A.B.A. J. 1717 (1977)
(prosecutors should be more active in criminal justice system, possible abuse of dis-
cretion curable).
5. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), the Court declined to ap-
ply the prosecutorial vindictiveness theory to pretrial plea bargaining. See notes 29-
32 and accompanying text in/ia. Lower federal courts have applied vindictiveness
to pretrial actions. In United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1977), the
1
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Court was confronted with this situation in State v. Stevens.6
Willie James Stevens was indicted originally for voluntary manslaugh-
ter and aggravated assault with a firearm enhancement.' He moved to
suppress evidence upon which his indictment was based.8 Before a ruling
on the motion to suppress, a second indictment was filed on the same trans-
action, charging the defendant with second degree murder with a firearm
enhancement. Four days later, the prosecutor filed a nolle prosequi9 with
respect to the first indictment. Notwithstanding the prosecutor's filing, the
trial court granted the motion to suppress. The defendant's subsequent mo-
tion to quash the second indictment was granted because that indictment
was filed while the first was still pending. The prosecutor then filed a third
indictment containing an open charge of murder. The third indictment
was quashed because it was based on evidence that had been suppressed.10
When the State appealed the quashing of the third indictment, the
New Mexico Court of Appeals reinstated it on the ground that the trial
court had exceeded its authority."1 A second motion to quash the indict-
ment was denied by the trial court.12 Prior to trial, however, the defendant
again moved for dismissal on the ground that the successive indictments on
more serious charges evidenced prosecutorial vindictiveness and denied him
due process of law. The trial court denied the motion, finding no
defendant exercised his right to a change of venue, and a second indictment con-
taining more severe charges was filed. Applying the appearance of vindictiveness
test, the court dismissed the indictment. Id. at 1225.
6. 96 N.M. 627, 633 P.2d 1225 (1981).
7. The State also sued in the alternative for involuntary manslaughter with a
firearm enhancement. Id. The defendant had shot and killed his girlfriend during
an argument.
8. The evidence consisted of an oral statement made by the defendant to a
detective after arrest. State v. Stevens, 93 N.M. 434, 435, 601 P.2d 67, 68 (Ct. App.
1979).
9. Nolle prosequi is "a formal entry upon the record. . . by the prosecuting
officer in a criminal action, by which he declares that he 'will not further prosecute'
the case, either as to some of the defendants, or altogether." BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 945 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
10. The prosecutor, in attempting to obtain the second indictment, had
presented evidence to the grand jury that the trial court had suppressed. 93 N.M.
at 435, 601 P.2d at 68.
11. Id. TJae trial court exceeded its authority by reviewing the grand jury pro-
ceeding and holding that the evidence presented to the grand jury must be legally
admissible. The appellate court, basing its decision on State v. Chance, 29 N.M. 34,
221 P. 183 (1923), held that a grand jury "is a judicial tribunal with inquisitorial
powers, and, unless there is some clear statutory authority to do so, we think the
courts are without power to review its action to determine whether or not it had
sufficient or insufficient, legal or illegal, competent or incompetent evidence upon
which to return an indictment." 93 N.M. at 435, 601 P.2d at 68.
12. 96 N.M. at 627, 633 P.2d at 1225.
19831
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The court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to
dismiss, finding that a presumption of vindictiveness arose following the
prosecutor's actions.4 The case was remanded to the trial court to give the
prosecutor the opportunity to present rebuttal evidence.' 5 If the evidence
failed to rebut the presumption, vindictiveness would be established and
the indictment quashed. The State appealed, however, and the Supreme
Court of New Mexico reversed the appellate court's decision, holding that
no presumption arose in the case. The defendant was required to prove
actual vindictiveness in order to have his case dismissed. 6
The three most important cases involving vindictiveness have been
handed down by the United States Supreme Court. In North Carolina v.
Pearce, 7 the Court applied a presumption of vindictiveness to judicial be-
havior. After successful appeal of his conviction, the defendant was con-
victed at a second trial. The same judge imposed a heavier sentence the
second time around."8 The Court required the record to reflect the reasons
for the heavier sentence to rebut the presumption of judicial vindictive-
ness. 9 The holding was based on two concurrent due process considera-
tions.2" First, "vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully
attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives
13. Id.
14. The rule of law creating the presumption was new in New Mexico, created
by the court of appeals in this case. State v. Stevens, 96 N.M. 753, 757, 635 P.2d
308, 311 (Ct. App. 1981), rev'd, 96 N.M. 627, 633 P.2d 1225 (1981).
15. In Stevens, the State argued that different prosecutors handled the case and
so no vindictiveness was present. The New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected the
argument, charging one prosecutor with the knowledge of the other. 96 N.M. at
756-57, 635 P.2d at 310-11. See also United States v. Alvarado-Sandoval, 557 F.2d
645, 646 (9th Cir. 1977) (irrelevant that prosecutor appearing was not personally
aware of record).
16. 96 N.M. at 630-3 1, 633 P.2d at 1228-29. See text accompanying notes 41-43
in/ra .
17. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
18. Id. at 713-15. In Pearce, the defendant was originally convicted for assault
with intent to commit rape. The trial judge sentenced him to twelve to fifteen years
in prison. Several years later, the defendant initiated a proceeding which
culminated in the reversal of his conviction. He was retried, convicted, and sen-
tenced by the same trial judge to a prison term which, including the years which he
had already served, was longer than the first sentence. Id.
19. Id. at 726. The Court further required that the reasons be "based upon
objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant
occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding." Id.
20. Some judges also feel that underlying these decisions is the notion that vin-
dictive behavior is morally wrong. See United States v. Andrews, 612 F.2d 235, 249
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after a new trial."2 1 Second, "due process requires that a defendant be
freed of apprehension of such retaliatory motivation on the part of the sen-
tencing judge"2 2 which could deter the exercise of procedural rights. The
Court recognized that "it is unfair to use the great power given to the court
to determine sentence to place the defendant in the dilemma of making an
unfree choice." 23 Judges therefore have an affirmative duty to clearly set
out in the record the reasons for imposing more severe sentences on criminal
defendants.
24
In the second case, Blackledge v. Perry,25 the Court extended the vindic-
tiveness notion to prosecutorial action and held that the re-indictment of
the defendant on a more serious charge after he had exercised a statutory
right to a trial de novo violated due process. A defendant's fear of retalia-
tion would otherwise deter him from fully exercising his rights.26 The
Court emphasized that actual retaliatory motivation was not essential, as
the test protects against the defendant's apprehension of vindictiveness, not its
existence.2 7 Due process is therefore offended by all situations that pose a
realistic likelihood of vindictiveness since they may chill a defendant's exer-
cise of his rights.2 8
The Supreme Court departed from the Pearce-Perry trend in
Bordenkircher v. Hayes,29 ruling that a defendant's due process rights were not
21. 395 U.S. at 725.
22. Id. This due process argument was developed from the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine. See Abrams, Systematic Coercion: Unconstitutional Conditions in the
Criminal Law, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 128 (1981); Smaltz, Due Process Limi-
tations on Prosecutorial Discretion in Re-Charging Defendants: Pearce to Blackledge to
Bordenkircher, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347, 349-353 (1979); Note, Unconstitutional
Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1595 (1960); Note, supra note 2, at 434-37.
23. 395 U.S. at 724 (quoting Worcester v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 713, 718 (1st
Cir. 1966)).
24. This rule does not apply where a more severe sentence is imposed pursuant
to a trial de novo before a different judge, Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116
(1972), or where the resentencing is performed by a different jury, Chaffin v.
Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 28 (1973). In both cases the Court found the danger of
retaliation to be minimal as the sentencing judge and jury had no personal stake in
the outcome of the defendant's case.
25. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
26. Id. at 28.
27. Id. In Perry, the Court admitted that there was no evidence of prosecutorial
bad faith or m'aliciousness. The Court also noted that this would be a different case
if it had been impossible for the State to bring more serious charges at the begin-
ning. Id. at 29 n.7. See Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912), where the de-
fendant was originally tried and convicted of assault and battery. Subsequent to
the original trial, the victim died. The defendant was tried a second time and con-
victed of homicide. No due process violation was found.
28. 417 U.S. at 21.
29. 434 U.S. 357 (1978),notedin 6 AM.J. CRIM. L. 201 (1978); 33 ARK. L. REV.
211 (1979); 66 CALIF. L. REV. 875 (1978); 27 DE PAUL L. REV. 1241 (1978); 3
1983]
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impaired when prosecutorial vindictiveness occurred in the context of plea
bargaining."0 The prosecutor admitted that he had acted vindictively be-
cause the defendant had refused to plead guilty, but the Court found that
an increase of charges as a part of the give and take of plea bargaining
contained no element of punishment or retaliation as long as the accused
was free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer.3" While difficult to rec-
oncile with Pearce and Peny, Bordenkircher has been limited to the context of
plea bargaining.
3 2
The vindictiveness which the constitution prohibits is "the imposition
of punishment . . . against a defendant for the purpose of retaliating
against him because he has exercised his legal rights rather than for the
purpose of imposing a sanction upon him for the crimes he has commit-
ted."'3 3 To ferret out retaliatory conduct, courts have responded to Pearce
and Perry by developing standards that a criminal defendant must meet in
order to establish prosecutorial vindictiveness.34 These standards focus on
prosecutorial intent and can be divided into three distinct tests: (1) the
appearance of vindictiveness, (2) a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness, and
(3) actual vindictiveness. The first and second tests raise a presumption of
vindictiveness againstthe prosecutor. The third test requires the defendant
to prove actual retaliatory motivation, a very difficult standard to meet.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has adopted
the appearance of vindictiveness standard.3 5 Under this test, the defendant
GLENDALE L. REV. 207 (1978); 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 249 (1979). See generally
Comment, Bordenkircher v. Hayes- Prosecutorial Discretion During Plea Bargaining, 27
BUFFALO L. REV. 563 (1978); Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion, Plea Bargaining and
the Supreme Court'r Opinion in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 269
(1978); Comment, Constitutional Law.- Due Process and the Bargained Plea, 18 WASH-
BURN L.J. 144 (1978).
30. 434 U.S. at 365. For the ethical considerations involved in prosecutorial
action, see Adlerstein, Ethics, Federal Prosecutors, and Federal Courts: Some Recent
Problems, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 755 (1978); Note, supra note 2, at 458-59.
31. 434 U.S. at 363.
32. 96 N.M. at 629, 633 P.2d at 1227. See also United States v. Andrews, 633
F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981); United States v. Allsup,
573 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 961 (1978); Watkins v. Solem, 571
F.2d 435 (8th Cir. 1978). But see United States v. Thomas, 617 F.2d 436, 438 n.1
(5th Cir. 1980) (re-indictment with enhanced penalties not prosecutorial vindictive-
ness). It should be noted that courts do not automatically uphold increased
sentences that result from unsuccessful plea bargaining. See, e.g., United States v.
Andrews, 612 F.2d 235, 249 & n.4 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981).
33. United States v. Walker, 514 F. Supp. 294, 312 (E.D. La. 1981).
34. Note, supra note 2, at 443.
35. United States v. Stacey, 571 F.2d 440, 444 (8th Cir. 1978). For other cir-
cuits using this approach, see Note, supra note 2, at 443 n. 17. Missouri also follows
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need only show that there is a possibility of vindictiveness, that an inference
of vindictiveness may be drawn from the facts of the case. The prosecutor
must negate this inference in order to proceed with the complaint. This
cautious approach recognizes the "tremendous harm to both the individual
and society which would attend a prosecutor's abuse of his discretionary
authority." 6 Although this approach renders maximum protection to a de-
fendant's rights, society's interests are not well served by a standard that is
so easily met.3 7 Prosecutors would be required to refute the presumption of
vindictiveness in the majority of cases and, in so doing, an unnecessary
burden would be placed on the criminal justice system.
A preferable approach is that enunciated in Perry: a realistic likelihood
of vindictiveness. This requires the defendant to show a substantial
probability of vindictiveness rather than the mere appearance of it.3" The
desirability of this approach stems from its balancing of two conflicting
rules of law: "1) prosecutors have and need broad discretion to file charges
where there is probable cause that someone broke the law; 2) vindictive
conduct by persons with the awesome power of prosecutors (and judges) is
unacceptable and requires control."3 9 The striking of this balance gives this
standard two advantages. First, defendants need not fear prosecutorial re-
taliatiorn for assertion of a constitutional or statutory right. Second, it is a
36. 571 F.2d at 444. The amount and type of evidence the State must produce
will vary depending on the court and the right asserted by the defendant. See
Smaltz, supra note 22, at 360-64; Note, supra note 2, at 448-450. Most courts have
not "specifically articulated the requirements for dispelling the appearance of vin-
dictiveness but have dealt with the issue on an ad hoc basis." United States v. An-
drews, 612 F.2d 235, 250 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981).
37. In United States v. Alvarado-Sandoval, 557 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1977), the
court, applying an appearance of vindictiveness standard, dismissed a more severe
second indictment which was procured after defendant's counsel indicated that no
plea would be entered because defendant might file a motion to suppress. Id. This
is very similar to Stevens, although the defendant did not actually exercise his consti-
tutional rights. In United States v. DeMarco, 550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1977), the
court found prosecutorial vindictiveness from the prosecutor's statements that he
might consider extra counts against the defendant. Id. at 1226. These cases show
the extremes to which the appearance of vindictiveness test can be extended.
38. Note, supra note 2, at 446.
39. United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 453 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 927 (1981). In Andrews, the prosecutor added charges to the original indict-
ment two days after the defendants successfully appealed a denial of bail. The
defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging prosecutorial vindictiveness.
The district court found for the defendants, using the appearance of vindictiveness
standard. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that although a prima facie case of
vindictiveness was established by the prosecutor's conduct, that case was rebuttable.
The case was then remanded to the district court to examine the credibility of the
prosecutor's explanation of the extra charges. See generall 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 540
(1980); 7 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 821 (1980); 25 VILL. L. REV. 365 (1979).
6
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realistic method to police vindictiveness without imposing undue burdens
on either the defendant or the state.4 °
The benefits of the Pery test are lost when the defendant must show
actual vindictiveness as the Stevens court demands. Actual vindictiveness
requires the defendant to establish a prima facie case of vindictiveness with-
out benefit of a presumption. To meet this burden, the defendant must
prove retaliatory intent, which is often difficult to do. It is easy for the
prosecutor to rebut the defendant's accusations,4" as the state need only
show nonvindictive reasons for the increased charge4 2 whether these were
the motivating factors or not.4 3
The actual vindictiveness standard itself is based on a misinterpreta-
tion of the law. The Fifth Circuit, in adopting this standard, reasoned that
Bordenkircher signalled a retreat from the principles of Perry and therefore
imposed a more stringent test. 4 The court failed to limit Bordenkircher to
plea bargaining, as most other courts have properly done because of the
unique nature of plea bargaining.45 The court extended Bordenkircher to sit-
40. United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 454 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 927 (1981).
41. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 724 n.20 (1969). See also United
States v. Andrews, 612 F.2d 235, 251-52 (6th Cir. 1979) ("Rare is the prosecutor
who will openly admit that he added on charges in retaliation against defendant."),
rev'd, 633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981).
42. United States v. Walker, 514 F. Supp. 294, 314 (E.D. La. 1981).
43. This standard will also place the judiciary and the prosecution in an unnec-
essary confrontation. The judge will be required either to allow the extra charge or
to make an explicit finding of prosecutorial bad faith rather than relying on the
presumption as the other standards allow. United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449,
455 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981). The court noted that judges
are reluctant to find bad faith when required to do so under this standard. Id. at
455 n.8. See a/so United States v. Andrews, 612 F.2d 235, 249 n.3 (6th Cir. 1979)
(Keith, J., dissenting), rev'd, 633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927
(1981).
44. United States v. Thomas, 617 F.2d 436, 438 n.I (5th Cir. 1980). In Thomas,
the defendants, originally indicted on 71 counts, succeeded in having all counts
dismissed. Two years later, they were re-indicted on 92 counts which included
charges not found in the first indictment. The defendants' attempt to quash the
indictment on the basis of prosecutorial vindictiveness was unsuccessful. Id. at 438.
See also Miracle v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1979); Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558
F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1049 (1978). In Jackson v. Walker,
585 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1978), the court applied a balancing test, weighing the extent
to which the second indictment would chill the defendant's exercise of his rights
against the extent to which precluding the second indictment would infringe the
prosecutor's discretion in order to determine which standard to apply. Id. at 145.
This may no longer be valid in light of Thomas.
45. See note 32supra. But see United States v. Walker, 514 F. Supp. 294, 315-25
(E.D. La. 1981) (institution of'more severe charges following successful challenge of
first conviction prima facie case of prosecutorial vindictiveness).
[Vol. 48
7
Matteuzzi: Matteuzzi: Prosecutorial Vindictiveness in a Pretrial Setting:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1983
PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS
uations it was never meant to govern and effectively ignored the principles
established in Peny, which only required a showing of a reasonable likeli-
hood of vindictiveness.
The Stevens court also failed to apply the Perry principles. The court
attempted to justify its application of an actual vindictiveness standard to
pretrial prosecutorial activity in various ways. It was first claimed that a
distinction should be drawn between pretrial activity and activity after
trial.4 6 The crux of this argument is that the prosecutor will not have suffi-
cient motive to act vindictively before trial. The court, however, neglected
to observe that there is ample opportunity for a prosecutor to develop retali-
atory motivation before trial-as is clear from the facts of this case.4 7 Fur-
ther, the court failed to note that the Supreme Court in Bordenkircher could
have dismissed the vindictiveness charge on the ground that the alleged
violation occurred before trial but did not do so. The Court instead found
justification for its holding in the specific characteristics of plea
bargaining.
48
The Stevens court also argued that the imposition of a pretrial presump-
tion would interfere with proper prosecutorial discretion.49 A majority of
courts, however, have recognized that the Perry principles, properly admin-
istered, do not inhibit the prosecutor's discretion, since he is still able to
raise charges for legitimate reasons.50
As the Stevens court deviates from the current trend in refusing to apply
a pretrial presumption of vindictiveness, its reasoning is unsound. Courts
should afford more protection to the due process rights of criminal defend-
ants who are faced with a vindictive prosecutor.
NANCY E. MATTEUZZI
46. 96 N.M. at 630, 633 P.2d at 1228.
47. See also United States v. Andrews, 612 F.2d 235, 248 n.2 (6th Cir. 1979)
(Keith, J., dissenting), rev'd, 633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927
(1981); Sefcheck v. Brewer, 301 F. Supp. 793, 795 (S.D. Iowa 1969).
48. See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra. See also U. CIN. L. REv., supra
note 39, at 548.
49. 96 N.M. at 630, 633 P.2d at 1228.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Partyka, 561 F.2d 118, 124 (8th Cir. 1977). The
Stevens court also argued that even if no presumption is imposed, the defendant will
still have the protection of a jury trial. 96 N.M. at 630, 633 P.2d at 1228. This
argument is without merit as it misconstrues the nature of prosecutorial
vindictiveness.
8
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